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STUDENT-ON-STUDENT SEXUAL HARASSMENT: 10Th
CIRCUIT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CIVIL LIABILITY OF
SCHOOL DISTRICTS AND SCHOOL OFFICIALS
INTRODUCTION
The American Association of University Women's study of the
prevalence of sexual harassment in schools throughout the United States'
engendered a flood of legal debate regarding the sexual harassment of
students. The study was the first major United States study of sexual
harassment in schools and outlined the prevalence of student-on-student
harassment in the American school system.2 The study reported that four
out of five students said they experienced unwanted and unwelcome sex-
ual behavior at school or during a school-related activity. 3 In addition,
four out of five students reported an incident of sexual harassment by
their classmates, while only eighteen percent reported harassment by an
adult in the school system.4 More than sixty five percent of students re-
ported that the harassment took place in the school hallways and fifty-
five percent reported that the harassment took place in the classroom
itself.'
In addition, the study outlined the effect of sexual harassment on
victims. Sexually harassed students reported that they did not want to
attend school, were less inclined to participate in class, found it hard to
study, stayed home from school or cut class, had lower grades, or had
second thoughts about whether they would graduate from high school.6
In all but one category, the number of girls who reported a negative im-
pact on their education was twice the number of boys.7 In addition, sig-
nificantly higher numbers of girls than boys reported feeling negative
emotions; including embarrassment, self consciousness, loss of confi-
dence, fear and confusion.8
The Tenth Circuit made unique holdings in the law surrounding stu-
dent-on-student sexual harassment in elementary, middle and high
1. See Hostile Hallways: The AAUW Survey on Sexual Harassment In America's Schools,
American Association of University Women Educational Foundation, June 1993.
2. Bryant, Ann, Sexual Harassment in School Takes Its Toll, USA TODAY MAGAZINE,
March 1, 1995, at 40.
3. See Hostile Hallways, supra, note 1, at 7.
4. See Hostile Hallways, supra, note 1, at 10-11.
5. See Hostile Hallways, supra, note 1, at 12.
6. See Hostile Hallways, supra, note 1, at 15.
7. See Hostile Hallways, supra, note 1. In the category of "Doubting Whether You Have
What It Takes to Graduate from High School," an almost equal number of males and females
responded that they did doubt whether they would graduate from high school (four percent of girls
and five percent of boys). See Hostile Hallways, supra, note 1, at 15 -16.
8. See Hostile Hallways, supra, note 1, at 16.
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schools. In 1999, the Court decided two cases holding school districts
and school officials liable for student-on-student sexual harassment un-
der two separate theories of recovery. 9 Part One of this survey will dis-
cuss the theory of recovery from individual school officials under the
state created danger doctrine. This doctrine allows recovery when a state
actor creates the danger that harms the plaintiff or makes the plaintiff
more vulnerable to a dangerous situation.' ° The state created danger doc-
trine was the basis of recovery in Sutton v. Utah State School for the
Deaf and Blind." Holding individual school officials liable for student-
on-student sexual harassment appears to be unique, as other districts re-
fused to do so under a state created danger theory.
In addition, the Court's decision in Murrell v. School District No. 112
allowed recovery based on a sexual harassment claim from a school dis-
trict under Title IX. 3 Title IX states that "[n]o person in the United States
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education pro-
gram or activity receiving financial assistance."' 4 The Circuit's decision
was based on a recent Supreme Court decision in Davis v. Monroe
County Board of Education '" that authorized recovery against school
districts when student-on-student sexual harassment is so pervasive that
it denies a student access to educational benefits and opportunities." This
decision again, appears to be a unique holding from the Tenth Circuit as
other circuits refused to acknowledge recovery for student-on-student
harassment under Title IX. Recovery under Title IX will be discussed in
Part Two of the survey.
I. STATE CREATED DANGER DOCTRINE
A. Background
The traditional federal method of recovery against state officials is
an action brought under 42 U.S.C. section 1983." In order to recoverunder section 1983, a state actor must violate an individual's constitu-
9. Murrell v. School District No. 1, 186 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 1999); Sutton v. Utah State
School for the Deaf and Blind, 173 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1999). This survey only analyzes cases
during the survey period that extends from January 1, 1999 to August 31, 1999.
10. See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
11. Sutton, 173 F.3d 1226.
12. Murrell, 186 F.3d 1238.
13. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a) (1994).
14. Id.
15. 119 S. Ct. 1661 (1999).
16. See infra notes 152-157 and accompanying text.
17. Adam Michael Greenfield, Annie Get Your Gun 'Cause Help Ain't Comin': The Need for
Constitutional Protection From Peer Abuse in Public Schools, 43 DuKE L.J. 588, 593 (1993)
(stating that "three areas of redress are potentially available ... [however] the section 1983 remedy.
. has attracted the most attention").
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tional right or the state must violate a federal law that specifically abro-
gates the state's sovereign immunity.'8 Section 1983 states that:
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State of Territory or of the District of Co-
lumbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.' 9
Section 1983 provides no substantive right, but instead provides the pro-
cedural basis for recovery when an underlying right is violated. 20
In the area of student-on-student sexual harassment, a student must
show that the school itself violated an underlying federal or constitu-
tional right in order to recover under section 1983.2t When a school offi-
cial deprives a student of his Fourteenth Amendment right to bodily in-
tegrity, that school official can be held liable under section 1983."
The issue that arises in the context of student-on-student sexual har-
assment is whether the failure of a school official to protect a student
from the student-on-student sexual harassment rises to the level of a con-
stitutional violation sufficient for a section 1983 action. The Supreme
Court first addressed the issue of a failure to protect in its 1989 decision
in Deshaney v. Winnebago.23
1. Supreme Court Treatment
In DeShaney, the mother of a four-year-old child sued the Depart-
ment of Social Services after her son was beaten so severely by his father
24
that he suffered traumatic brain injuries. Prior to this final beating, the
local hospital contacted the Department of Social Services several times
21
about the suspected abuse of the child.
18. See Chapman v. Houston Wel-fare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617-18 (1979); Baker v.
McCollan 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
20. See supra, Greenfield, note 17, at 593 (stating that "the statute creates no substantive
rights of its own but provides a vehicle for enforcement of rights already guaranteed by the
Constitution or by federal law").
21. See supra, Greenfield, note 17, at 596.
22. William W. Watkinson, Jr. Shades of Deshaney: Official Liability Under 42 U.S.C. section
1983 for Sexual Abuse in the Public Schools, 45 CASE W. RES. 1237, 1245 (1995) (stating that a
public official will be held liable under section 1983 for the deprivation of the Fourteenth
Amendment right to bodily integrity).
23. DeShaney v Winnebago County Dep't of Social Serv., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
24. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193.
25. See id. at 192. The Department of Social Services entered into a voluntary agreement with
the father that allowed Joshua to return to his father's custody. See id. Following the return of Joshua
to his father's custody, the Department received two more phone calls from the local emergency
20001
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The lawsuit brought by Joshua's mother alleged that the County, the
Department of Social Services, and various individual employees of the
Department of Social Services violated Joshua's substantive due process
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to intervene to protect
him against the risk of violence of which they knew or should have
26known. Joshua's mother brought the action under 42 U.S.C. section
1983. 27
The Supreme Court began its analysis by stating that while these
were very tragic circumstances, nothing in the Due Process Clause re-
quires the state to protect the life, liberty, or property of a citizen against
private actors.2 Based on this principal, the Court held that the Due Pro-
cess Clause confers no affirmative right to governmental aid, even when
that aid may be necessary to secure life interests if the government itself
did not deprive the individual of that interest .29 However, the Court stated
that an affirmative duty to protect does arise if the state places a limita-
tion on an individual's freedom to act on his own behalf. ° Additionally,
the Court stated that while the state may have been aware of the dangers
facing Joshua, the state did nothing to create the danger or to make him
more vulnerable to the danger.3
2. Lower Court Treatment
The DeShaney decision formed the backbone of the state created
32danger doctrine. The language that "the state did nothing to create the
danger," or make the child more vulnerable to the danger, allowed lower
courts to infer that if the state did create the danger or make the plaintiff
more vulnerable to a situation, the state could be held liable.33 The earli-
est case to employ the state created danger doctrine held that a material
question of fact existed as to whether a state patrol officer acted with
deliberate indifference by leaving the plaintiff on the side of a road in a
high crime area late at night.34 After the patrolman left the woman, she
accepted a ride with a stranger and was subsequently raped. In that
room about suspicious injuries. See id. at 192-93. The final beating left Joshua with lifelong
traumatic brain damage. See id. at 193.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 193; see also supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
28. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195.
29. See id. at 196.
30. See id. at 200 (citing as an example when a person is placed in an institutional setting).
31. See id. at 201.
32. Ashley Smith, Students Hurting Students: Who Will Pay?, 34 Hous. L. REV. 579, 582
(1997).
33. Id. at 582 n.18.
34. Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 588 (9th Cir. 1989).
35. Wood, 879 F.2d at 589-90.
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case, the Ninth Circuit referred to the DeShaney decision and alluded to
16
the creation of the state created danger doctrine.
Just a few years later, the Ninth Circuit, in L.W. v. Grubbs,3 7 more
explicitly used the state created danger doctrine in order to uphold a
claim brought by a registered nurse that worked in an institution for
young male offenders.' Upon employment, the nurse's supervisor
promised that she would not be forced to work alone with violent sex
offenders.39 However, the supervisor selected a resident to work alone
with the nurse. 4° While working alone, the resident kidnapped, robbed,
and raped the nurse. 4' The Court stated that the supervisor was aware of
the resident's propensities, treatment failure, and was aware that the of-
fender was very likely to "commit a violent crime if left alone with a
female., 42 The Court further held that the state's deprivation of the plain-
tiffs freedom or liberty was not a prerequisite to using the state created
danger doctrine.43 Other circuits followed the Grubbs court's lead in
holding that a deprivation of the plaintiffs freedom or liberty is not a
prerequisite to employing the state created danger doctrine.
44
The Tenth Circuit first discussed the state created danger doctrine in
UhIrig v. Harder.4 ' The decision involved a challenge to the termination
of a special unit in a mental hospital that was reserved for the criminally
insane.4 Following termination of the unit, the hospital placed criminally
insane patients in the general population.47 One criminally insane patientS 48
killed an activity therapist. The therapist's husband, on behalf of his
wife's estate, sued the administrators of the hospital under section 1983. 49
The Court stated that in order for the plaintiff to recover he must show
that 1) the killer was a member of a definable group, 2) the administra-
tor's conduct put the deceased at a "substantial risk of serious, immedi-
ate, and proximate harm," 3) the risk was obvious or known, 4) the ad-
ministrators acted recklessly in "conscious disregard of that risk," and 5)
the conduct of the administrators was conscience shocking. 50 The Court
36. See id.
37. L.W. v Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119, 120 (9th Cir. 1992).




42. Id. at 120-121.
43. See id. at 122.
44. See Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1990); Cornelius v. Highland Lake,
880 F.2d 348, 354 (11 th Cir. 1989).
45. 64 F.3d 567 (10th Cir. 1995).
46. Uhlrig, 64 F.3d at 567.
47. See id. at 569.
48. See id. at 570.
49. See id. at 567.
50. Id. at 574.
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ultimately decided that the actions of the administrators were insufficient
to support the state created danger doctrine."
However, the Tenth Circuit took this precedent and applied the state
created danger doctrine in a unique setting-holding school officials
liable for student-on-student sexual harassment. To date, no other circuit
has applied this doctrine to school officials when the actual harasser is a
student. As the next section will demonstrate, the Sutton decision pro-
vides students who have been harassed by a peer one avenue for seeking
relief from individual school officials; however, it does not provide any
foundation for holding liable a school district as a whole.
B. Tenth Circuit Case-Sutton v. Utah State School for the Deaf and
Blind 2
1. Facts
James Sutton, a minor, was diagnosed with severe cerebral palsy,
mental retardation and total blindness." James was able to communicate
with sign language.54 James attended the Utah State School for the Deaf
and Blind.55 On February 16, 1995 James signed to his mother that a boy
at school had sexually assaulted him while he was in the bathroom.56
James' mother immediately notified the school superintendent, the prin-
cipal and James' teacher." The following morning, James' mother met
with the principal and James' teacher.5" During the meeting, the principal
and teacher assured James' mother that the children were not allowed to
go to the bathroom alone and that it was impossible that the abuse could
have happened. 59 The principal and teacher also promised that James
would be supervised while in the bathroom. 60
On February 23, 1995, James was attacked in the bathroom by the
same perpetrator.6' A teacher's aide took James to the bathroom and
62stood outside the open door waiting for him. However, she left in order
63
to answer a ringing telephone. Three minutes later she returned, found
51. See id. at 576.
52. Sutton v. Utah State School for the Deaf and Blind, 173 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1999).













the door closed, and heard strange noises.64 She entered the bathroom,
forced open the stall, and found the boy sexually assaulting James. 6' The
complaint alleged that James suffered severe physical and psychological
harm, uncontrollable rages, severe nightmares, compulsive and uncon-
trollable behavior, and severe mental distress as a result of the attacks.66
In February 1996, James' mother filed a claim with the Utah Depart-
ment of Education seeking damages for physical pain and emotional dis-
67 61tress. In May, the claim was denied. James' mother then filed a claim
in state court alleging negligence.69 She named the school and the princi-70
pal, in his individual and official capacity, as defendants. The claim was
then amended to include claims of breach of contract, promissory estop-
pel, and a section 1983 claim based on a violation of James' due process
rights." The school sought removal of the claim to federal court based on
the section 1983 claim." The federal district court dismissed the federal
action for failure to state a claim and refused to hear the remaining state
claims.73
2. Decision
On appeal, the Court first addressed the issue of Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity that is granted to "arms of the state. 74 The school raised
75the issue of immunity for the first time at the appellate level. The court
applied a four-factor test to determine if the school was an arm of the
76state. In applying the four factors, the Court found that the school was
an arm of the state and therefore was entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity.77 However, the court held that the school waived its immunity
through an "extraordinarily effective waiver., 78 The school's immunity
64. See Sutton, 173 F.3d at 1230.
65. See id. at 1230-31.








74. Id. at 1232. The Court explained that whether a political entity was an arm of the state was
based on four factors: 1) the characterization of the unit under state law; 2) the guidance and control
exercised over the entity by the state; 3) the degree of state funding the entity receives; and 4) the
entity's ability to issue bonds and levy taxes on its own behalf. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id.; see also supra note 60 and accompanying text.
77. See Sutton, 173 F.3d at 1233.
78. Id. at 1235.
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was waived by consent to the suit through the removal of the case to fed-
eral court and litigation of the merits of the case."
Second, the Court addressed the viability of the claim as brought
against the school and the principal in his official capacity. The Court
stated that because the school and the principal in his official capacity
were not considered "persons" for purposes of the action; the claims
failed.80
Third, the Court addressed the viability of the claim against the
principal in his individual capacity. The Court held that a state official in
his individual capacity is considered a "person" for purposes of a section
1983 claim."'
Because the claim was viable, the court went on to state the general
rule derived from DeShaney.82 The Court stated the general rule as: "[A]
state does not have a constitutional duty to protect its citizens from pri-
vate violence ...[and] state actors are generally liable under the Due
Process clause only for their own acts. '83 However, the Court also recog-
nized two general exceptions to this rule: 1) the special relationship doc-
trine; and 2) the state created danger doctrine. 84
In order to recover under the state created danger doctrine, the
plaintiff must demonstrate intentional or reckless affirmative conduct on
the part of the state official that created the danger." In addition, the de-
gree of "outrageousness and a magnitude of potential or actual harm"
must be "conscience shocking."'86 Finally, the actor must be aware of the
known or obvious risk and that serious harm would follow if the actor
acted in disregard of the risk.87 The Court further held that this standard
could be applied to a failure to adopt or implement a training policy to
prevent the deprivation of constitutional rights. 8 Again, this failure must
be with "deliberate indifference., 89 The Court stated that the failure of
the principal to adopt or implement a training policy to prevent sexual
assaults on disabled children was clearly established at the time the as-
79. See id. at 1236.
80. See id. at 1237. The Court relied on Supreme Court precedent stating that "neither a State
nor its officials acting in their official capacities are 'persons' under § 1983." Will v. Michigan Dept.
of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64-65 (1989).
81. See Sutton, 173 F.3d at 1237.
82. See id.; see also DeShaney v Winnebago County Dep't of Social Serv., 489 U.S. 189
(1989).
83. See Sutton, 173 F.3d at 1237.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 1238.
86. Id. (quoting from Andrews v. Flower, 98 F.3d 1069, 1078 (8th Cir. 1996)).
87. See Sutton, 173 F.3d at 1238.
88. See id. at 1239.
89. Id. at 1240.
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sault took place.9° Therefore, the decision of the district court was re-
versed and the claim was remanded.9'
C. Other Circuit Decisions
The Third Circuit was one of the earliest Circuits to address the issue
of student-on-student sexual harassment in the context of the state cre-
92
ated danger doctrine. In D.R. v. Middlebucks Area Vocational Techni-
cal School,93 seven male students sexually molested two female high
school students two to four times per week during January through May
of 1990.94 The class was routinely in a state of "pandemonium" and was
supervised only by a student teacher.9 The parents of the two students
brought an action against the school district and the individual teachers
96and school officials on behalf of their daughters. The suit was based on
the constructive knowledge of the student teacher and on the actual
knowledge of the Assistant Director of the school.97
In discussing the state created danger theory, the court stated the
need for an affirmative act that "works to the plaintiff's detriment in
terms of exposure to danger., 98 The Court stated that the official's act in
assigning a student teacher and failing to supervise more closely could
pose a foreseeable risk of physical injury created by the state entity.
99
However, the type of injury suffered by the plaintiffs was not of the kind
foreseeable based on the officials' actions.1l° The Court stated that the
evidence was insufficient to establish a claim under the state created
danger theory.'0'
In 1996, the Seventh Circuit addressed the issue of student on stu-
dent harassment as it related to the state created danger doctrine in
Nabozny v. Podlesny.102 A student who attended Ashland Public School
District throughout his middle and high school years brought suit against
several school officials and the District claiming a violation of his equal• - 103
protection and substantive due process rights. The student was con-
tinually sexually harassed and physically abused by fellow students be-
90. See id. at 1241.
91. Id. at 1242.
92. See D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical School, 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir.
1992).
93. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1364.
94. Id. at 1366.
95. See id. at 1366 &1374.
96. See id. at 1365.
97. See id. at 1366.
98. Id. at 1374.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 1375.
102. Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996).
103. Nabozny, 92 F.3d at 449.
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cause he was a homosexual.' °4 Even though the school had policies in
place for investigating and punishing student-on-student sexual harass-
ment and school officials were repeatedly made aware of the harassment,
the court denied recovery under the state created danger doctrine. °5 The
Court stated that although the officials intentionally failed to act, no evi-
dence suggested that this failure was an affirmative act that placed the
student in danger or increased any pre-existing danger; a requirement for
recovery under the state created danger doctrine. 106
One year later, the Seventh Circuit followed the same line of rea-
soning as it did in Nabozny.'07 In Stevens v. Umsted,'08 a parent, on behalf
of his blind and developmentally disabled son, sued the school superin-
tendent of the Illinois School for the Visually Impaired for a violation of
his son's substantive due process rights. '0' The suit was based on several
sexual assaults that took place while the boy was a resident student at the
school."0 The complaint alleged that after the superintendent had actual
knowledge of the incidents, the sexual assaults continued."' The District
Court granted a motion to dismiss finding that the superintendent did not
have a constitutional duty to protect the student."' On appeal, the appel-
lants raised the issue of a state created danger for the first time.' The
Seventh Circuit held that in order to maintain an action, the plaintiff must
plead facts showing some affirmative act on the part of the state, not
merely an omission or failure to act, which created the danger or made
him more vulnerable to an already existing danger.' '4 The Court went on
to reference DeShaney,"5 and stated that "the most that [could] be said
was that [the superintendent] stood by and did nothing."
' 6
While few Circuits addressed the issue of student-on-student sexual
harassment under the state created danger theory,"' many Circuits ad-
104. See id.
105. See id. at 460.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. Stevens v. Umsted, 131 F.3d 697 (7th Cir. 1997).
109. Stevens, 131 F.3d at 699.




114. See id. at 705. The Court went on to state that the people of the state may prefer a system
of liability based on failure to act in certain situations, however the Court could not "thrust" this
upon the people by expanding the Due Process Clause. See id.
115. Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Serv., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
116. Stevens, 131 F.3d at 705. The Court further stated that, like DeShaney, the facts in the case
were "sad and troubling," however, the question did not involve the "grievous and deplorable harm
endured" by the plaintiff; only whether the defendant had a constitutional duty to protect the
plaintiff. See id.
117. See supra notes 93-116 and accompanying text.
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dressed the state created danger doctrine under other circumstances in
public school settings. "8 However, no other circuits have held officials
liable under the state created danger doctrine."9
D. Analysis
As the cases in the previous section demonstrate, the Tenth Circuit is
the only Circuit to hold individual school officials accountable for stu-
dent-on-student harassment under the state created danger theory. In ad-
dition, it is among very few Circuits that used the state created danger
theory at all in holding schools accountable in any context under the state
created danger doctrine.
1. Tenth Circuit Analysis
The plaintiff in Sutton overcame a host of hurdles that others have
failed in order to recover under the state created danger doctrine. Among
these hurdles are: a list of offenses to which the school did not respond; 20
an ability to prove an affirmative act on the part of officials," and the
limited applicability of the doctrine."'
First, the plaintiff mother in Sutton was able to list numerous specific
occasions on which her son was sexually assaulted while at the school."'
The plaintiff met the requirement that one commentator, Barbara Hor-
witz, termed a "grocery list of offenses" to which the school did not ade-
quately respond. 124 In contrast, the plaintiff in Middle Bucks was only
118. See infra note 119.
119. See generally Doe v. Hillsboro Independent School District, 113 F.3d 1412 (5th Cir. 1997)
(holding that the state created danger doctrine does not apply to a school that employed a known
felon as a custodian after an elementary student was raped by the custodian); Johnson v. Dallas
Independent School District, 38 F.3d 198 (5th Cir. 1994) (while not recognizing the state created
danger doctrine in the Fifth Circuit, holding that the state created danger doctrine would not apply
when the plaintiff alleged a generally violent environment after a student was shot and killed on
school grounds); Leffall v. Dallas Independent School District, 28 F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding
that while the state created danger doctrine was not recognized in the Fifth Circuit, a school district
would not be liable under the doctrine for sponsoring a dance at which a student was shot in the
parking lot after the event); Sargi v. Kent City Board of Education, 70 F.3d 907 (6th Cir. 1995)
(holding that the state did not create that danger that resulted in the death of a child on a school bus
due to inadequate rules, regulations and training); Mitchell v. Duval County School Board, 107 F.3d
837 (1 th Cir. 1997) (holding that a school sponsored function was an insufficient creation of danger
when a student was killed during a robbery following a school sponsored function).
120. Barbara L. Horwitz, The Duty of Schools to Protect Students From Sexual Harassment:
How Much Recovery Will The Court Allow?, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1165, 1210 (1995).
121. See Watkinson, supra note 22 at 1281.
122. See Watkinson, supra note 22 at 1281.
123. Sutton v. Utah State School for the Deaf and Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1230-31 (10th Cir.
1999).
124. Horwitz, supra note 101.
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able to show a general state of "pandemonium" which was imputed
through constructive knowledge to the student teacher. 2-
Second, the Sutton plaintiff was able to show that the direct action
(leaving the child unattended in the bathroom stall) of a school official
(the teacher's aide) enhanced the danger to her son. 6 If the teacher's
aide remained with the child while in the bathroom, the perpetrating stu-
dent would be deterred from assaulting the child because of the aide's
supervisory powers over the students. In addition, the lack of policies,
regulations, and supervision of employees in handling student-on-student
sexual harassment amounted to a direct act of deliberate indifference.'27
However, other plaintiffs have been unable to show either a direct action
or an absence of policies and procedures.""
Finally, some courts limited the scope of their inquiry to the period
in which the sexual harassment took place.29 For example, in Nabozny,
the policies and procedures for dealing with student-on-student sexual
harassment were in place prior to the commission of the harassment. 3
While the harassment took place (the scope of the court's inquiry) school
officials only engaged in inaction, therefore the court found the state
created danger doctrine inapplicable.' In addition, in Middle Bucks, the
school district's affirmative acts of assigning the teacher and creating a
unisex bathroom occurred prior to the actual sexual abuse.'32 However,
this narrow scope of inquiry ignores the reality that a school's actions
prior to the sexual harassment can significantly contribute to the resulting
sexual harassment. 133
2. Policy Issues Surrounding Student Sexual Harassment
Even though the prevalence of sexual harassment is high and the ef-
fect grave, many school districts find themselves in a precarious situa-
tion. On one hand, school officials are concerned about the problem of
sexual harassment and its effect on students in the education system.134
125. See D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical School, 972 F.2d 1364, 1366 (3d
Cir. 1992).
126. Sutton, 173 F.3dat 1231.
127. Id. at 1240.
128. See D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical School, 972 F.2d 1364, 1366 (3d
Cir. 1992) (finding constructive notice inadequate); Nabozny, 92 F.3d at 460 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding
that policies and procedures were in place for dealing with student-on-student sexual harassment).
129. Greenfield, supra note 14, at 613.
130. Nabozny, 92 F.3d at 460.
131. See id.
132. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1366.
133. Greenfield, supra note 17, at 613.
134. Laura M. Sullivan, An Evolutionary Perspective of Peer Sexual Harassment in American
Schools: Premising Liability on Sexual, Rather Than Power Dynamics, 3 WM. & MARY J. OF
WOMEN & L 329 (1997).
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On the other hand, because of the way the law has been written and in-
terpreted, schools feel forced to take a hands-off approach to students'
daily activities in order to avoid civil liability. 35
These requirements encourage school districts to remove themselves
from the daily lives of students. By simply putting policies and proce-
dures in place and then turning a blind eye to the actions of students,
school districts are able to evade the deliberate indifference standard for
recovery under the state created danger doctrine. 3 7 Reporting policies
that thwart notice to high ranking officials place students in greater dan-
ger of experiencing sexual harassment and suffering from the effects of
student-on-student sexual harassment.1
38
If schools follow this course of action, students are provided little, if
any, protection from sexual harassment. For example, if a school creates
a policy that requires notice to be given to the child's home room
teacher, but the harassment is taking place in the hallway or cafeteria, the
teacher may not be able to prevent the harassment. In addition, the school
official who may be able to prevent the harassment has not been "noti-
fied" for purposes of the law and therefore the official would not be li-
able under the current Tenth Circuit decision.
This possible scenario is disturbing considering sixty-six percent of
harassment takes place in the hallway, forty-three percent takes place
outside of school, but on school grounds, thirty-nine percent of students
report harassment in the gym, on the playing field, or in the pool area,
and thirty four percent report harassment in the cafeteria.
In addition, if no recovery is available for plaintiffs from school dis-
tricts, injured students may sue individual teachers who are bound by the
inadequate reporting procedures. 140 Inadequate policies based on a delib-
erate indifference standard may create a hostile environment that affects
the teaching and learning of all students in the classroom.' 4' If a teacher
135. Greenfield, supra note 17, at 619.
136. See Greenfield, supra note 17, at 619 (stating as an example a case in which a school
board was able to avoid liability simply by putting in place policies that did not allow information to
reach the school board, thereby evading liability because no deliberate indifference was
demonstrated.).
137. See Greenfield, supra note 17, at 620.
138. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
139. See Hostile Hallways, supra note 1, at 13.
140. One commentator notes:
We come to school holding our children's rights in one hand and our attorney's business
card in the other-all the while demanding that staff protect, nurture, and teach our little
darlings. At the same time, though, we insist that our children enjoy every freedom and
bask in self-esteem. In other words, we want it all.
Audra Pontes, Peer Sexual Harassment: Has Title IX Gone Too Far?, 47 EMORY L.J. 341, 342
(1998).
141. In response to similar concerns, one court noted in dicta that the case
compels us to provide clear warning to the [Board of Education] that in the future a
defense of no liability due to lack of knowledge may no longer apply to a bureaucracy
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is more concerned with personal liability than with teaching, the quality
of education and the students will suffer.
In addition, the requirement of actual notice on the part of individual
officials may encourage teachers to ignore incidents of harassment and
discourage dialogue between students and teachers. If a teacher knows
that he may be held civilly liable for sexual harassment if the student
notifies him and the teacher knows that the reporting policies of the
school are ineffective, he may avoid conversations that lead to the disclo-
sure of the harassment. Again, this leaves harassed students with no as-
sistance in dealing with student-on-student sexual harassment. These
unresponsive and inadequate procedures are evidenced by the alarming
statistic that only seven percent of students report sexual harassment to a
teacher. 4' This is especially alarming for boys because of the mere seven
percent of reports to teachers, girls reported twice as often as boys.
The final question becomes what message does this send to children
and adolescents. Unresponsive teachers and administrators send the mes-
sage that sexual harassment is an ordinary part of life for students. The
message is also sent to harassers that their behavior is acceptable. This
sends the message to those who are being harassed that no help is avail-
able to them. In light of the significant impact that sexual harassment has
on children's self esteem, enthusiasm for learning, and willingness to
even attend school; lack of action in response to sexual harassment ig-
nores a significant problem in the education system and lowers the qual-
ity of education for all children.
II. TITLE IX CLAIMS
A. Background
Title IX provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving financial assistance."' 44 Based on the language of the statute, it
is difficult to infer Congress' intent regarding sexual harassment. 145 In
addition, Title IX started as a floor amendment; therefore little informa-
tion is available regarding Congress' intent.' 46 However, the floor debates
which continues to block notice of the [Board of Education] of allegations of sexual
abuse of students committed ... during school related activities.
Thelma D. v. Board of Education, 934 F.2d 929, 936 (8th Cir. 1991).
142. See Hostile Hallways, supra note 1, at 25.
143. See Hostile Hallways, supra note 1, at 25.
144. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a) (1994).
145. Pontes, supra note 140, at 344.
146. Pontes, supra note 140, at 344. A floor amendment is an amendment that is introduced to
the entire chamber instead of to a committee of Congress. United States Senate Definitions, Last
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provide some insight as to the overall purpose of Congress. One such
report included a statement by then Senator Bayh stating that "[Title IX]
is a ... comprehensive measure which I believe is needed if we are to
provide women with solid legal protection as they seek education and
training for later careers .... , In addition, the judiciary and scholars
often turn to Title VI and Title VII in order to interpret Congress' intent
with regard to Title IX. 141
Although peer sexual harassment in public schools was not discussed
at the inception of Title IX, the judiciary recently applied Title IX in the
public school setting. However, the Supreme Court has been careful to
limit a school's liability to instances when there is notice of the sexual
harassment on the part of an appropriate official and an act of deliberate
indifference on the part of school officials. 149 The earliest case that ad-
dressed student-on-student harassment occurred in June of 1998. In the
case, the United States Supreme Court decided Gebser v. Lago Inde-
pendent School District.'50 The Court held that in order for an action to
lie against a school district for sexual harassment by a teacher, the school
district must have actual notice and show deliberate indifference to the
harassment."'
Next, in August of 1999, the Supreme Court addressed the same
question involving student-on-student sexual harassment. 52 The Supreme
Court held that in instances of student-on-student sexual harassment, a
school district may be held liable if school officials act with deliberate
indifference and the harassment becomes so severe that it, in effect, bars
the student's access to an educational opportunity or benefit.'53 The Su-
preme Court also limited liability for student-on-student sexual harass-
ment to cases when notice is sufficient and the district has substantial
control over both the harassing student and the context in which the har-
assment occurs. 5 4 The Court also stated two caveats: 1) gender based
name calling and teasing are insufficient for a claim under Title IX; 5
and 2) school boards maintain flexibility in developing policies and
dealing with specific instances of sexual harassment.
Updated January 21, 2000, < http://www.senate.gov/learning/leam-glossary-more.html>. Therefore,
there are no committee hearing transcripts available to aid in interpreting Congress' intent.
147. 118 Cong. Rec. 5806-07 at 522 (1972).
148. Pontes, supra note 140, at 344.
149. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998).
150. Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1993.
151. See id.
152. See Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 119 S. Ct. 1661 (1999).
153. Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1671.
154. See id. at 1672.
155. See id. at 1675.
156. See id.
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These two Supreme Court cases laid the foundation for school dis-
trict liability for sexual harassment and led to the Tenth Circuit's
groundbreaking decision holding an individual public school district li-
able for peer sexual harassment.
15 7
B. Tenth Circuit Case-Murrell v. School Dist. No. 1158
1. Facts
The plaintiff, Penelope Jones, was born with spastic cerebral palsy,
developmental disabilities, deafness in her left ear and functioned at the
level of a first grader. "9 Upon high school enrollment, the plaintiff's
mother informed the principal and teachers that Ms. Jones had previously
been sexually assaulted and shared her fear of further sexual assaults.'60
The principal and teachers assured Ms. Jones' mother that she would be
properly supervised. 161
Ms. Jones was placed in the same classroom as "John Doe." '162
School officials knew that John Doe had behavioral problems including
engaging in inappropriate sexual conduct."' Even so, the school ap-
pointed John Doe as the "janitor's assistant" which gave John Doe access
to unsupervised areas of the school.'64
In November of 1993, school officials became aware that John Doe
was engaging in inappropriate sexual conduct towards Ms. Jones.165 In
addition, Ms. Jones' mother told school officials that John Doe had been
calling her house.'66
During this same time period, John Doe sexually assaulted Ms. Jones
on several occasions.16 During one assault, a custodian discovered the
two students and saw blood and vomit. 16 The custodian instructed the
students to clean up, return to class, and informed the teachers. 69 How-
ever, the teachers did not inform Ms. Jones' mother.170 Instead, they tied
157. See Murrell v. School District No. 1, 186 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 1999).
158. Murrell, 186 F.3d 1238.
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extra clothing around Ms. Jones' waist to hide the blood. 7 ' Also, after
another incident, Ms. Jones was told not to tell her mother and to try to
forget that the assault happened. On another occasion, after the teach-
ers discovered that Ms. Jones had been sexually and physically assaulted,
they told Ms. Jones' mother only about the physical assault.
73
As a result, Ms. Jones began to engage in self destructive and suici-
dal behavior.7 4 Ms. Jones then entered a psychiatric hospital. "' After she
was in the hospital, Ms. Jones' mother found out about the sexual as-
saults. 76 Ms. Jones' mother immediately contacted the teachers. 77 The
teachers denied any incidents and instructed the mother to return Ms.
Jones to school. 78 Ms. Jones' mother also left a telephone message with
the principal about the assaults. 179 The principal never returned her phone
call and did not investigate.'80
Ms. Jones attempted to return to school following her
hospitalization."' Upon return, she was battered by John Doe and "ridi-
culed" by students."' At a meeting with the principal and teachers, the
principal and teachers were "hostile" to Ms. Jones' parents and suggested
that the sexual activity had been consensual. ' The principal refused any
further investigation. ' In addition, the principal suspended Ms. Jones for
"behavior which is detrimental to the welfare, safety, or morals of other
pupils or school personnel."'8 5 The principal did not, however, inform
law enforcement or discipline John Doe in any way.16
2. Decision
Ms. Jones' mother brought a suit against the district on her behalf
seeking damages under Title IX. In addition, she filed two claims
against the teachers and principal individually under 42 U.S.C. section
1983 for denial of equal protection and a violation of Ms. Jones' due
















187. See id. at 1242.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
S 188
process rights. The District Court dismissed the action for failure to
state a claim. 19 Following oral arguments, the Court abated the case
pending the Supreme Court's decision in Davis v. Monroe County Board
of Education.1 90
In interpreting the Supreme Court's decision, the Court of Appeals
stated a four-factor test for determining recovery under Title IX.' 9' The
four factors are: 1) the district must have actual knowledge of the har-
assment; 2) the district was deliberately indifferent to the harassment; 3)
the harassment was so "severe, pervasive and objectively offensive" that
it 4) deprived the victim of "access to the educational benefits or oppor-
tunities provided by the school."'92
Because the Davis decision did not specifically define the type of
notice required, the Court of Appeals held that actual notice must be
given to an official who has "requisite control" over the situation in order
to meet the notice prong of the test.1 93 The inquiry as to which school
official may have "requisite control" over a situation is a fact-based in-
quiry. 194 Factors used to determine which official has requisite control
over a situation may include those officials who have the power to trans-
fer the harassing student to a different class, suspend the student, curtail
the student's privileges, or provide additional supervision.'9' The Court
held that Ms. Jones had given sufficient notice to the principal and that
the principal had the requisite amount of control over Ms. Jones.1
9 6
Therefore, the knowledge of the principal could be charged to the school
district.' 97 In support of its determination, the court pointed out that the
school's sexual harassment policy stated that grievances should be filed
with the principal and that the principal had the power to suspend stu-
dents.'"
In addressing whether Ms. Jones teachers had the requisite amount
of control, the court gave no dispositive answer.' 99 However, the court
stated that it is possible for teachers to meet the definition of appropriate
persons if the victim is complaining to a teacher about a fellow student's
action during school hours and on school grounds.29" The court further
188. See id.
189. See id. at 1245.
190. See id.; Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 119 S. Ct. 1661 (1999).





196. See id. at 1247.
197. See Murrell, 186 F.3d 1246.





stated that the teachers' actions "plainly" amounted to deliberate indif-
ference. °1
In addition, the court found that the principal acted with deliberate
indifference to Ms. Jones' situation, thereby meeting the second prong of
202the test. The court stated that the principal's complete refusal to inves-
203
tigate, if true, amounted to deliberate indifference.
Third, the sexual assaults took place over the course of a month;
thereby meeting the requirement that the harassment be "severe, perva-
sive, and objectively offensive. 2 °4
Finally, the court stated that Ms. Jones became a danger to herself
and others following the assaults and required hospitalization; thereby
meeting the fourth prong of the test.2°5 In addition, the principal sus-
pended Ms. Jones and Ms. Jones was housebound as a result.2° These
207actions denied Ms. Jones any educational opportunities or benefits.
Therefore, because Ms. Jones' complaint met all four factors of the
test, the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's decision regard to
208the Title IX claim.
C. Other Circuits
Because Davis was decided very recently, few circuits have inter-.. 209
preted the Supreme Court's decision. The Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals relied partly on Davis when addressing the issue of a professor'sS 210
harassment of a student in a University setting. However, the decision
is of little help because the case involves the sexual harassment of a Uni-
211
versity student by a professor.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that in order to
recover under Title IX, a school must have notice of and show deliberate
indifference to the sexual harassment.! '2 In addition, based on Davis, the
Court held that in order to recover a plaintiff must show that the harass-
201. Id.
202. See id.
203. See Murrell, 186 F.3d 1248.
204. See id.
205. See id.
206. See id. at 1249.
207. See id.
208. See id. at 1251.
209. The Fifth Circuit briefly mentioned the Davis decision. See Wills v. Brown University,
184 F.3d 20 (5th Cir. 1999); See also O'Hare v. Colonial School Dist., 1999 WL 773506 (E.D.Pa.
September 29, 1999).
210. Wills, 184 F.3d at 36-37.
211. See id. at 23.
212. See id. at 35.
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ment resulted in the denial of educational benefits or the "alteration of
conditions" of the educational environment on the basis of sex. '13
The Court found that the student was subjected to a hostile environ-
ment.' 4 In addition, the Court found that the University received actual
notice of the several sexual harassment claims based on the student's
complaint to the provost as well as evidence that revealed that the Uni-
S215
versity knew of other incidents prior to the immediate complaint.
Next, the Court stated that as a matter of law, the trial court took an
"unduly restrictive view" of sexual harassment based on a hostile work
environment. 2 6 The Court stated that the factors that should be taken into
account when addressing the indifference of the University should be the
nature of the harassment, its duration, the role and nature of contact of
the harasser and victim before and after the harassment, other harassing
acts known to the school, and the conditions that are altered by the con-
217tinuing presence of the harasser. The Court concluded that a reasonable
fact-finder could be persuaded that the University acted with deliberate
indifference and therefore the trial court erred.1 8
In addition, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania District Court re-
cently interpreted the Davis decision. The parents of a minor brought an
action against the school district, superintendent, principal, and a teacher
when a student in the school's photography darkroom repeatedly sexu-
ally assaulted their minor daughter.2' 9 The District Court stated that the
claims were brought under Title VII and therefore the Davis decision
was not controlling. However, the Court further stated that the Davis
holding required actual knowledge and deliberate indifference on the part
of the officials2 and harassment "so severe, persuasive and objectively
offensive that it can be said to deprive the plaintiff of the education op-
portunities and benefits provided by the school., 22 The Court went on to
hold that the plaintiff had not alleged any facts sufficient to make the
Davis holding "analogous or relevant" to the decision. 22 However, it is
difficult to compare the Davis decision and the O'Hare decision because
the District Court decision provides very little information as to the spe-
cific facts of the case.
213. Id. at 36.
214. See id. at 40.
215. See id.
216. See Wills, 184 F.3d at 42.
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. O'Hare, 1999 WL 773506 at*1.
220. See id. at *5.
221. See id.





After the decision in Lago Vista, commentators criticized the Su-
preme Court for its failure to address the issue of student-on-student har-
224assment. This criticism is especially relevant considering that the ma-
jority of sexual harassment occurs between students and students and not
between teachers and students . 25
The Davis decision, however, provides an outlet for liability when
student-on-student sexual harassment occurs. However, the parameters
of that liability are strictly defined, making it difficult for a student to
recover. 226 The Tenth Circuit decision provides a good example of the
difficulty of proving liability. For example, even though the Supreme
221Court did not state that actual notice was required, the Tenth Circuit
interpreted the Supreme Court's decision to include actual notice, creat-
ing a greater barrier to recovery.228
Proponents of strict liability or agency theories argue that liability
based on actual notice and indifference does not go far enough to en-
courage school districts to aggressively deal with the problem of sexual
harassment." 9 Considering the grave effect of and overwhelming amount
of sexual harassment that takes place in schools, easing the notice and
deliberate indifference requirements may encourage schools to take a
more proactive approach in dealing with student-on-student sexual har-
assment.
However, this creates the problem of sorting out frivolous lawsuits.
Should a school district be held liable for civil damages because a six-
year-old child kisses a female classmate? Most people would probably
say no. What if the child is in sixth grade? A sixth grade teacher re-
sponded to allegations of sexual harassment by some boys of a girl in his
class that "[the student] was so beautiful that the guys would be all over
her in a couple of years."23 Does this rise to the level that schools should
be held civilly liable? Determining these factual questions is difficult.
The safeguards of notice and deliberate indifference provide some meas-
ure of security to school districts that isolated events will not become a
bankrupting lawsuit. If a school district is bankrupt due to unlimited
224. Amy K. Graham, Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District: The Supreme
Determination That Children Deserve Less Protection Than Adults From Sexual Harassment, 30
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 551, 599 (1999).
225. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 134-138 and accompanying text.
227. Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 119 S. Ct. 1661, 1675 (1999).
228. Murrell v. School District No. 1, 186 F.3d 1238, 1246 (10th Cir. 1999); see also Sullivan,
supra note 134, at 29.
229. Richard A. Weller, Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District: School District
Remains Afloat in Title IX Litigation Floodwater, 50 MERCER L. REV. 781,789 (1999).
230. Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. School Dist., 935 F. Supp. 162, 167 (N.D.N.Y 1996).
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damages awards, all students' educational opportunities are impaired.23'
Furthermore, some advocates argue that holding districts liable for stu-
dent-on student harassment will impact the educational system as a
whole by frustrating current educators and discouraging others from be-
coming members of the educational system."' At the same time, when a
school district is aware of and ignores pervasive harassment, an outlet for
liability exists for the injured student.
The adherence to a policy of requiring actual notice is very different
from claims brought under Title VII, which requires only constructive
notice. 23' Title VII is often the basis of sexual harassment lawsuits
brought by employees against employers. Proponents of a stricter notice
requirement argue that the stricter requirement of notice is appropriate
because of the population of children and adolescents with which schools
234are dealing. Children and adolescents are developing and experiment-
231
ing with behavior that would be considered inappropriate for an adult.
A stricter requirement of notice provides some allowance to school dis-
tricts that are trying to regulate the experimental behavior of children and
adolescents.
However, proponents of a constructive notice standard argue that the
requirement of actual notice leaves more children at risk of suffering the
effects of sexual harassment. 2" An advocate for the National Organiza-
tion for Women said "[w]e'll just keep litigating the issue. If women in
the workplace should not have to endure sexual harassment, why should
young girls have to endure it at school? ' 23 7 Because the requirements of
Title IX are stricter than Title VII, child victims are given fewer protec-
tions from sexual harassment in order to allow more flexibility for har-
assers. The actual notice standard ignores the' immense harm suffered by
victims of sexual harassment. The standard also ignores the long-term
impact that may be suffered by victims of sexual harassment.
In addition, the actual notice standard does little to prepare harassers
for the workplace. Schools are charged with the responsibility of edu-
cating and preparing young people for the workforce. If a student is al-
lowed to harass fellow students in a school setting because of looser
standards placed on the school district; as an adult, that student may be
unprepared to deal with the current culture of the American workforce.
231. Richard Fossey, Let The Master Answer: Holding Schools Vicariously Liable When
Employees Sexually Abuse Children, 25 J.L. & EDUC. 575, 593-96 (1996).
232. Pontes, supra note 140, at 376.
233. Julie C. Doss, Peer to Peer Sexual Harassment Under Title IX: A Discussion of Liability
Standards from Doe v. Londonderry, 34 TULSA L.J. 443,462 (1999).
234. Doss, supra note 233, at 461.
235. See Doss, supra note 233, at 462 (stating that "in addition to the curriculum, students learn
about many different aspects of human life and interaction from school").
236. Doss, supra note 233, at 456.
237. Doss, supra note 233, at 458.
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Sexual harassment is not tolerated in today's working society. By ignor-
ing harassing behavior as a child, the school and the judiciary provide a
disservice to children as they mature into adults and join the workforce.
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit has taken strong steps to establish liability of
school officials and school districts for student-on-student sexual har-
assment. The Sutton decision provided for individual liability of school
officials under the state created danger doctrine. This decision allowed
a student recovery based on the demonstration of knowing and reckless
affirmative conduct of the principal by not enforcing appropriate sexual
harassment policies, "9 the degree of which was outrageous and "con-
science shocking."24
The Tenth Circuit's decision to hold the principal accountable was a
unique one. No other district has held a school official liable for student-_ - 241
on-student harassment under the state created danger doctrine. In ad-
dition, the Tenth Circuit was the first Court of Appeals to find a school
district liable under Title IX for student-on-student sexual harassment.
While both of these decisions provide an outlet for recovery for student
victims of sexual harassment, the question remains as to whether these
decision, which both require actual notice and indifference, are appropri-
ate for addressing the problem of student-on-student sexual harassment.
Advocates for more liability on the part of schools argue that the
standards increase the danger to students by encouraging schools and
officials to take a hands-off approach to the problem. Advocates on the
other side insist that schools must retain some flexibility in dealing with
children before being bankrupted by frivolous lawsuits.
There are no easy answers. The problem of sexual harassment is
complex and requires a careful balancing of the interests of the victims of
sexual harassment and the school officials forced to deal with this perva-
sive problem. However, one issue remains clear. Sexual harassment is
pervasive in the American school system and the effect on victims is
severe. While the Tenth Circuit's decisions may not be ideal, the deci-
sion is a first step in dealing with this pressing issue facing America's
school children.
Amy E. Richards
238. See Sutton v. Utah State School for the Deaf and Blind, 173 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1999).
239. Sutton, 173 F.3d at 1238.
240. id.
241. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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